What ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clause 6.1.3(d) actually requires, what an accredited audit examines at each stage, and why a well-maintained Statement of Applicability matters beyond the certificate itself.
Ask most people preparing for their first ISO/IEC 27001 certification audit what the Statement of Applicability is, and the answer is some version of: the list of the 93 Annex A controls, with a column marking each one applicable or not. That's a common shorthand, but it's technically incomplete. Clause 6.1.3 requires an organisation to determine the controls it needs to treat its risks — which can include controls that aren't in Annex A at all — and only then compare that list against Annex A to check nothing necessary has been missed. Under 6.1.3(d), the resulting Statement of Applicability has to record a justification for every control that's in, a stated implementation status for each one, and a justification for every Annex A control that's been left out. A yes/no column against a fixed list of 93 items is a checklist. What the clause describes is closer to a documented, examinable argument, with the risk assessment and risk treatment process as its evidence.
That gap between the two readings is not academic. Published auditor guidance — including ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27's own auditing practice notes on the Statement of Applicability and on Annex A — repeatedly identifies weak, outdated or poorly justified SoAs as a recurring source of audit findings. The issue is rarely a missing control. It's usually that the reasoning behind the list doesn't hold up under examination: a control marked applicable with no traceable basis, an exclusion recorded as "not applicable to our business" rather than a documented reason, or an implementation status describing an intention rather than the organisation's actual position.
None of that requires a new development to be worth setting out — it's a standing pattern, which is exactly why it's worth being precise about outside the pressure of a booked audit. What follows sets out what clause 6.1.3(d) requires, what an accredited audit examines at each stage under ISO/IEC 27006-1, and why that independent scrutiny is worth more than the paperwork it produces.
The Statement of Applicability is not produced in isolation, and in an established ISMS it is rarely produced only once. It sits in a sequence that repeats as the organisation's risk position changes, and that a certification body examines at more than one point:
Most of the failure patterns below trace back to treating the SoA as a document produced once, straight from Annex A, rather than as something that has to keep answering to the risk treatment behind it.
Annex A groups its 93 controls into four themes: organisational (37 controls), people (8), physical (14) and technological (34). Annex A itself is not a requirements list to work through line by line — ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27's own auditing guidance is explicit that a control's presence in Annex A does not, on its own, make it necessary to a given organisation, and describes Annex A as an aide-memoire for checking completeness rather than a checklist to satisfy. The correct order reverses how many organisations actually work: determine the controls necessary to treat the risks identified in the risk assessment — which can include controls outside Annex A — compare that list against Annex A to confirm nothing necessary was missed, and only then produce the SoA recording the result.
Including all 93 Annex A controls is not, on its own, a problem. ISO/IEC 27001 does not reward exclusions, and an audit shouldn't infer weak risk analysis merely from how many controls are marked applicable. What gets examined is whether each one has a stated reason — and SC 27's own guidance is direct that simply appearing in Annex A is not itself that reason. The same logic runs the other way for exclusions: "not applicable to our business" is not, on its own, a justification. A justification ties the decision to the organisation's assessed risk, a legal or contractual obligation, or another documented, independently justifiable basis.
Clause 6.1.3(d) asks for a justification, not a specific document format, and ISO/IEC 27001 doesn't require an organisation to keep something literally called a "risk register." Necessity most often comes from the organisation's assessed risks, but it can equally come from legal or contractual obligations, or, exceptionally, another independently justified basis where the underlying risk is hard to quantify. What every necessary control needs is a traceable rationale in the organisation's risk-treatment arrangements — which a Statement of Applicability copied from a previous cycle, a template, or another organisation's document, without being revisited, generally will not have. Reused, unrevisited SoAs are a consistently flagged source of avoidable inconsistency.
Clause 6.1.3(d) requires the SoA to state whether each necessary control is implemented or not — not whether it's intended, planned, or scheduled. An SoA that accurately distinguishes implemented controls from ones that aren't yet is more useful, and more accurate, than one that records intentions as facts. That accuracy is necessary but not sufficient on its own: Stage 2 goes on to test whether the controls recorded as implemented actually are, and whether they're effective — not simply whether the document says so.
An accredited ISO/IEC 27001 certificate is independent assurance that an organisation's risk assessment and risk treatment process, the controls it has determined as necessary, its Statement of Applicability, and the implementation and effectiveness of those controls have actually been examined against the standard — not merely that the organisation completed its own paperwork.
It does not guarantee that a security incident will never occur, and it does not mean there is only one valid way to treat a given risk. Its value is independent, competent scrutiny of whether an organisation's own risk-based decisions are coherent, implemented and effective — scrutiny that has to come from a party with no stake in how the ISMS was designed in the first place.
Three questions are usually enough to tell whether a Statement of Applicability will hold up under that kind of examination: does every control marked applicable have a traceable basis in the organisation's risk treatment, legal or contractual obligations, or another documented reason; does every exclusion state a reason beyond a variant of "not applicable"; and does the implementation status reflect where the organisation actually is, not where a project plan expects it to be. An SoA that answers those honestly is doing what clause 6.1.3(d) asks of it, independent of its age or format.
The same standard of evidence is worth applying to anyone claiming certification: ask for the accreditation certificate itself, not the marketing claim, and check the relevant accreditation body's public register — DAkkS, UKAS, ANAB, RvA and equivalents — for the standard, edition and scope actually covered. Proks Certification GmbH is DAkkS-accredited for ISMS certification; our current scope, DAkkS document D-ZM-21201-01-02, covers DIN EN ISO/IEC 27001:2024-01 — the German and European adoption of ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — audited under DIN EN ISO/IEC 27006-01:2024-08, and forms part of our parent accreditation, D-ZM-21201-01-00.
Proks's role is deliberately different from an ISMS consultant's. ISO/IEC 17021-1 requires a certification body — together with any part of the same legal entity and any entity under its organisational control — to remain impartial, and prohibits offering management-system consultancy alongside certification. We can explain what clause 6.1.3(d) and the rest of the standard require, and clarify audit findings; we do not draft a client's Statement of Applicability or choose its controls. That separation isn't a limitation we work around — it's part of what makes accredited certification worth something a consultant can't independently provide.
Underneath the documentation requirement, clause 6.1.3(d) asks an organisation to put something in writing: which risks it has decided to treat, which it has decided not to, and why — specific enough that someone else could examine the reasoning later. Explicit, reviewable risk decisions are useful in their own right, independent of certification, because they turn judgement calls into something that can be checked rather than assumed.
What accredited certification adds is a party with no stake in how the ISMS was designed, testing whether that reasoning actually holds up against the evidence — a different kind of value than help getting the paperwork in order, and why accredited certification is worth more than the sum of the documents it produces.
A well-designed Statement of Applicability belongs to the organisation that wrote it. An accredited certification body's role is to test, independently and competently, whether the reasoning behind it is consistent with the ISMS and supported by evidence. If you're considering ISO/IEC 27001 certification and want to understand Proks's accredited scope, certification process or audit stages, get in touch.
Last reviewed: 22 September 2026. This article explains what ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clause 6.1.3(d) requires of a Statement of Applicability, and what an accredited audit examines, in general terms; it is not accreditation, audit, or legal advice for any specific organisation's ISMS.
DEUTSCHE FASSUNG
22. SEPT. 2026 / STANDARDS
What ISO/IEC 27001:2022 clause 6.1.3(d) actually requires, what an accredited audit examines at each stage, and why a well-maintained Statement of Applicability matters beyond the certificate itself.
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